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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the relationship of semantic equivalence as 
described by Donald Davidson in his theory of meaning, showing its 
limits above all in respect to language use in the contextual situation. 
The notion of equivalence used by the “first” Davidson does not 
successfully explain why some biconditionals are simply true and 
why others, besides being true, offer the real translation of the 
source sentence. The paper argues that the main limits of the 
Davidsonian proposal, which lie in the very attempt to apply 
Tarskian theory of truth to natural languages, are partially overcome 
later by Davidson himself. Above all in his paper A Nice 
Derangement of Epitaphs (1986), Davidson rejects the very idea of 
an “invariance of meaning” and proposes a “second” notion of 
equivalence, described as the research of momentary and always 
changing points of convergence of interpreter and speaker, 
depending on contextual information. This convergence is possible 
because of a “deeper equivalence,” a common cognitive apparatus 
that allows communication to take place. At any rate, as the paper 
aims to demonstrate, this solution seems to simply shift the problem 
on to another level of explanation. Once this level of “deeper 
equivalence” is reached, there is too no explanation of exactly how a 
translator can understand contextual implications in order to grasp 
functional equivalence. 
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1. Semantic Equivalence in Davidson’s Theory of 
Meaning 
 
Davidson’s early papers, collected in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (1984), attracted the attention of Translation Studies 
after a heated and often misleading debate on linguistic relativism 
and Quine’s thesis on indeterminacy of translation, which denied the 
existence of any “plausible sort of equivalence relation however 
loose” among sentences (27). Davidson’s famous argument on the 
very idea of a conceptual scheme showed the impossibility of a 
radical difference between speakers and a massive failure in 
translation, in accordance with the common sense of the practice of 
translation.1 According to the principle of translatability, there is a 
“deeper equivalence”, a wide common background that makes 
comprehension possible. This common base of communication 
relies on the fact that speaker and interpreter share the same 
cognitive apparatus. As Malmkjær noted, translation scholars 
discussed the Quinean thesis on the indeterminacy of translation in 
depth, but the later work by Davidson is largely unknown. His last 
papers, especially A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs (1986), as this 
paper will show, are remarkably interesting, because they propose a 
linguistic theory that can be used as a valid conceptual tool for the 
analysis of the translation process: 
It is therefore good to see that references and reactions to 
Quine's indeterminacy thesis have begun to re-enter translation 
literature Unfortunately, references to Davidson's more 
                                                 
1 For a brief but insightful review of the role of analytical philosophy in translation 
theory, see K. Malmkjær (1998: 8-13). 
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optimistic view are rarer, and I do not believe that his later 
writings – absent even from Benjamin – have yet been 
absorbed by the community of translation scholars. This is a 
pity since the later work stresses difference and the fluidity of 
language to a degree which should make it impossible any 
longer to misread Davidson as seeking to establish “an original 
and archaic site of meaning” and “an unmediated access to the 
world” (Malmkjær 1993: 135). 
 
At the same time, translation scholars were searching for a 
highly formalised model of translation that could provide a formal 
explanation of translation phenomena and could offer real laws of 
translation as tools for translation work. In order to do this, as 
Catford claimed, “it is clearly necessary for translation theory to 
draw upon a theory of meaning” (35). And Davidson’s theory of 
radical interpretation seemed to be able to answer the philosophical 
question on meaning, revealing the translation of any given sentence, 
whether expressed in another language or in the same language of 
the original sentence. The theory Davidson proposed, tried to get to 
the root of the problem of meaning, providing a radical interpreter 
with a corpus of information which is both necessary and sufficient 
to understand his own interlocutor. It must give an explanation of a 
potentially infinite number of sentences, starting from a finite basic 
vocabulary and finite set of rules to be used by an interpreter who 
has finite powers.2 Davidson claimed that if a theory wants to have 
these features and be able to give for any given sentence s its 
equivalent sentence p in any other natural language, then it needs to 
                                                 
2 “A satisfactory theory of meaning must give an account of how the meanings of 
sentences depend upon the meanings of words. Unless such an account could be 
supplied for a particular language, there would be no explaining the fact that, on 
mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules, we are prepared to 
produce and to understand any of a potential infinitude of sentences” (Davidson 
1984: 17). 
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adopt Tarski’s theory of truth as formal model. Furthermore, the 
theory needed to be empirically verifiable and capable of giving a 
holistic, global explanation of how a natural language works. 
The model of translation proposed by Davidson soon showed its 
limits with regards to the explanation of translation phenomena, 
precisely because of formal problems within the theory itself. 
Despite its interesting attempt to borrow the concept of equivalence 
from Tarski’s theory of truth to define translation in natural 
languages, another problem with Davidson’s theory was the real 
application of this concept of equivalence to translation in natural 
languages. In fact, the concept of equivalence borrowed from 
Tarski’s theory of truth soon seemed too rigid to explain the various 
kinds of equivalence that Translation Studies pointed out in relation 
to the various features of natural language that remain constant in 
real cases of translation.3 For example: 
 
(1) Chi non risica, non rosica. (Italian) 
Nothing ventured, nothing gained.  
 
(2) Ho preso due piccioni con una fava. (Italian) 
I killed two birds with one stone.  
 
Referring to the conditions of truth of these sentences does not 
explain why, in the first example, we can consider the second 
sentence a translation of the first, even though the translation does 
not respect an acoustic equivalence. Nor can it explain why in the 
second example we can consider the second sentence a translation of 
the first one, just because it respects a functional equivalence. In this 
theoretic context, we lost the possibility of explaining a great variety 
of translation phenomena linked to other kinds of equivalence of 
                                                 
3 For an introduction to the concept of translation equivalence, see Koller (1989: 
99-104), Draskan (1986), Jäger & Neubert (1982), Newman (1994: 4694-4700), 
Snell-Hornby (1995: 13-22), Halverson (1977), and Kenny (1998). 
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some properties of natural languages that Davidson’s theory cannot 
explain.  
One of the greatest difficulties, as Tarski himself highlighted, is 
the fact that natural languages are too unstable, confusing and 
complex to apply formal methods to them. In natural languages, a 
single expression can have more than one meaning, a not-well-
defined meaning, or it can contain some indexical terms that make it 
true or false depending on the context. So it would not be possible 
even to presuppose a complete dominion of the syntax of an object-
language, which, as in any natural language, does not have clearly 
defined outlines. Furthermore, it is impossible to establish which 
new words might be added to the finite vocabulary of a natural 
language: natural languages are not “static” like formalised 
languages, instead they are in constant evolution, because new 
expressions or words can always be added. So the worry of 
translation scholars was, as Tarski had foreseen, that “the language 
of everyday life, after being ‘rationalized’ in this way, would still 
preserve its naturalness and whether it would not rather take on the 
characteristic features of the formalized languages” (1956: 267). In 
order to apply an appropriate Tarskian analysis of natural languages, 
Davidson should have demonstrated first that Tarskian methods can 
actually be applied to natural languages. 
Despite the fact that Davidson’s theory did not include the 
explanation of many cases of translation equivalence in real 
translations, we could search for a theory that explains why a 
translation is a translation in general, without referring to the issue 
of a translation’s degree of quality. In the previous cases, we can 
state that the first translation is a bad translation from the point of 
view of acoustic equivalence, while the second case is a good 
translation from the point of view of functional equivalence. But 
both of them are translations. Translation scholars needed to 
understand why such translations can be considered translations at 
all, irrespective of whether they are good or bad. Above all, they 
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wanted to understand why something can be considered a translation 
despite its apparent lack of sameness of meaning, as in the second 
case we considered. 
Moreover, the Tarskian model helped Davidson give an 
explanation of the meaning and thus of the sameness of meaning in 
terms of truth conditions, avoiding intensional notions like those of 
meaning and synonymy (having the same meaning), which did not 
seem to “oil the wheels of a theory of meaning” (Davidson 1999: 
20-21). In fact, the theory Davidson aimed to build can neither 
presuppose nor refer to meanings of sentences, because it has to 
provide an exact explanation of them, so what is required for a 
theory of meaning is a characterisation of the meaning of sentences 
by a strictly extensional formulation. At any rate, as this paper 
intends to demonstrate, Davidsonian theory of meaning failed to 
give an explanation of what translation is, even with regard to very 
simple sentences from a syntactic and a semantic point of view. 
According to his extensional approach to meaning, Davidson 
believed that the meaning of a sentence can be explained “in terms 
of truth,” indicating its truth conditions (Hacking 1975: 173). 
Because we cannot assume the sentence on the right side of a T-
sentence has the same meaning (nor that it is a translation) of the 
sentence on the left side, the meaning of the sentence on the left side 
might be understood by indicating the truth conditions in the 
sentence on the other side. The radical interpreter can indicate the 
truth conditions in order to understand the meaning of foreign 
utterances, because he already has a certain understanding of the 
“ordinary” concept of truth. So he already knows when the T-
sentences are true. But it was pointed out that in this way there could 
be some biconditionals the translator recognises as true and correct 
from an extensional point of view, even though they do not offer the 
translation of the sentence he wants to translate.4 To say that two 
                                                 
4 See criticisms in Hacking (1975: 142-145), Segal (1999: 48-56), and Foster 
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sentences that make up a true T-biconditional are equivalent means 
that they have the same truth-value. Two sentences which imply 
each other are equivalent. Sentences with the same meaning are 
equivalent, and yet equivalent sentences can differ in meaning!  
Therefore the translator would know that all the following 
biconditionals are true: 
 
(3) “La neve è bianca” is true if and only if snow is white. 
(4) “La neve è bianca” is true if and only if grass is green. 
(5) “La neve è bianca” is true if and only if snow is white and 2 
+ 2 = 4. 
 
But the translator would know only that they are true 
biconditionals and, without knowing the meaning of the foreign 
sentences, he would not be able to say which biconditional 
effectively is the translation of the sentence “La neve è bianca”. He 
would not know how to translate it at all! The solution is not found 
by claiming that the correct biconditional on the right side provides 
the translation of the sentence on the left side, because we cannot 
presuppose the concept of translation.5 So the corpus of information, 
given by Davidson to the translator, would not be sufficient to 
guarantee the choice of the theory that implies the semantically valid 
T-sentence.  
According to Davidson, we can recognise at least some analogies 
between the structure of the sentence “La neve è bianca” and the 
sentences in English “Snow is white” or “Grass is green”. 
Eventually we would prefer the biconditional that associates “La 
neve è bianca” to the sentence “Snow is white”, which “we have 
                                                 
(1976: 1-32). 
5 “What we require, therefore, is a way of judging the acceptability of T-sentences 
that makes no use of the concepts of translation, meaning, or synonymy, but is 
such that acceptable T-sentences will in fact yield interpretations” (Davidson, 
1984: 150). 
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good reason to believe equivalent” (1999: 26). If by the term 
“equivalence” we mean “semantic equivalence,” it would be 
difficult for the translator as a radical interpreter to recognise this 
“equivalence” between the sentence on the right side and the one on 
the left side of the biconditional. In fact, from the beginning, 
Davidson presupposed that the translator does not know the 
meaning of the sentences, so he cannot say whether there is such an 
equivalence. But in a situation of radical interpretation, the 
interpreter cannot suppose even a syntactic-grammatical equivalence 
between the sentences of the foreign speaker and the sentences of 
his own language. In fact, the radical interpreter cannot draw any 
analogy in a situation like the following: 
 
(6) “Skuppit gromper” is true if and only if rubies contain coal. 
 
In this case, as pointed out by J. Heal, the radical interpreter 
could believe “Skuppit gromper” is a disordered set of sounds 
without meaning (1997: 175-195). He has no possibility of 
understanding in which sense the two sentences can be equivalent. 
 
 
2. In Search of the Semantically Correct 
Equivalent 
 
Davidson proposed to solve this specific problem by finding the 
biconditional that offers a real equivalent sentence in another 
language, the semantically correct T-sentences for any sentence of a 
language, through an empirical verification based on “facts about 
the behaviour and attitudes of speakers in relation to sentences” 
(1984: 133) He identified two different moments: a verification 
before the interpretation has begun and a successive verification led 
by the Principle of Charity. This passage was particularly interesting 
for translation scholars because it shows how the theory can be 
Francesca Ervas 15 
 
verified in real cases of translation and how they can be generalised 
in order to obtain laws of translation which allows us to predict 
future cases. In any case, this attempt encounters another series of 
difficulties. 
According to Davidson, empirical evidence available to a radical 
interpreter before the interpretation has begun is the attitude of 
holding true a sentence by a speaker x at a given time t. But is it 
possible to identify this attitude without referring to any theory of 
interpretation? It is not easy to establish when the interpretation 
begins if, as Davidson claims, the interpretation of sentences is 
strictly bound to the interpretation of beliefs and intentions of a 
speaker; or if it is part of a single interpretative project which 
unifies linguistic behaviour and intentional actions of a speaker 
through holistic criteria. If we adopt this point of view, the 
acknowledgement of a speaker’s attitude of holding true a sentence 
already requires an interpretative act by the interpreter. If everything 
is holistically included in a single project, we cannot say that the 
interpreter can recognise a speaker’s intentional attitude before the 
interpretation has begun. How is it possible then to say that a radical 
interpreter holds true a sentence without “having any idea of what 
truth” (Heal 1997: 135).6 is and without knowing what the sentence 
means and what the speaker’s beliefs are?  
To identify a single attitude of holding true a sentence, the 
radical interpreter must be able to distinguish voluntary from 
involuntary behaviour and linguistic from non-linguistic behaviour. 
He can only make these distinctions if he has some hypotheses that 
involve the speaker’s beliefs and intentions. Furthermore, holding 
true a sentence is something that can be done within the background 
of a set of a community’s linguistic (and non-linguistic) practices 
the radical interpreter does not know.7 So if we want to identify the 
                                                 
6 On the attitude of holding true a sentence, see Davidson (2001: 137-153). 
7 See criticism in Picardi (1989). 
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attitude of holding true a sentence, we need to imagine a situation 
which differs greatly from that of Davidsonian situation of radical 
interpretation. The hypothesis of basing interpretation on the 
speaker’s attitude of holding true a sentence is too weak for the 
interpreter to understand the speaker without knowing his language 
or beliefs.  
Nevertheless, even if we assume a situation which is different 
from that of a radical interpreter, that is to say a situation which is 
more similar to a real translator, what remains to clarify is how to 
use this set of sentences held true by different speakers in different 
situations as evidence to support the semantically correct T-
sentence, the real translation. If the successive verification is based 
on publicly available evidence, it is not possible to give an overall 
explanation of how natural language works, because we cannot 
consider many cases of linguistic utterances for which there is no 
publicly available data (e.g., “Gods live in Olympus”). At any rate, 
it is clear that even if the empirical check succeeds in a significant 
sample of cases, we can never be sure that the sentence placed on 
the right side of the T-sentence gives the meaning of the sentence 
placed on the left side. In fact, if a sample of n confirmed cases 
gives us the verification we are looking for, how can we be sure the 
next case (n+1) will also be confirmed? The constraints imposed on 
Davidson’s theory do not guarantee the passage from the 
verification of n cases to the verification of the next case n+1. But 
the translator must be able to predict future cases to understand the 
meaning of a potentially infinite number of sentences the speaker 
may utter. 
In Foster’s opinion (1976), in order to guarantee that the theory 
offers us T-sentences which actually give the meaning of the 
speakers’ expressions, it has to provide the interpreter with some 
prescience of the meaning of the sentences. But Davidson’s theory 
comes with some biconditionals containing mere regularities which 
cannot be projected on to still unobserved cases. The biconditionals 
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do not establish a link of nomic character between the “left” 
sentence and the “right” one. From Foster’s point of view, if such 
biconditionals are not laws, they cannot support the appropriate 
counterfactuals. In the essay Reply to Foster (1976), Davidson 
accepts Foster’s remarks to solve the problem of extensionality. 
Both the biconditional (7): “‘La neve è bianca’ is true if and only if 
snow is white” and the biconditional (8): “‘La neve è bianca’ is true 
if and only if grass is green” are recognised as correct by Davidson’s 
extensional theory, even though only the first is semantically valid. 
In Davidson’s opinion, we could solve this problem by recognising 
the nomological character of T-sentences. In fact, the biconditional 
(8) is not a law, because it cannot support the appropriate 
counterfactuals. The counterfactuals in question would respectively 
be: 
 
(7) “La neve è bianca” wouldn’t be true if snow weren’t white.  
(8) “La neve è bianca” wouldn’t be true if grass weren’t green. 
 
In the second counterfactual, there could be a possible different 
world, where grass is not green but snow is white. But the 
nomological solution also is not free from difficulties. For instance, 
there could be some worlds where “Snow is white” does not mean 
that snow is white, but that grass is green, because there are different 
linguistic conventions from ours. In such a case, the biconditional 
(8) would be correct.8 Even if we concede to Davidson that the 
biconditional (8) cannot be considered a law in his system, the 
problem of extensionality is not completely solved. In fact, by 
means of the nomological solution he did not succeed in eliminating 
another kind of biconditionals seen above:  
 
 (9) “La neve è bianca” is true if and only if snow is white and 2 
+ 2 = 4. 
                                                 
8 Compare the Introduction in Fodor & Lepore (1992: III). 
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Davidson’s response to this objection was that his theory of 
interpretation, “being an empirical theory, favours simplicity, like 
any other empirical theory” (1999: 57). Therefore, according to 
Davidson, this last biconditional should be rejected, because by 
adding irrelevant clauses, the criterion of simplicity imposed on 
theory would not be respected. But who is to judge the simplicity of 
the biconditionals, and on what basis? The concept of simplicity is 
too relative, because it would involve the consideration of many 
different opinions and interests. The requirement of simplicity does 
not solve the problem; what “simplicity” might mean is too vague. 
Such a requirement would not be respected in any case, because we 
could build a T-sentence and thus a law for every sentence of an 
object-language. But as we know, Davidson proposed that sentences, 
though constructed with a finite vocabulary and system of rules, are 
potentially infinite. How could a theory that builds a law for every 
linguistic utterance of a speaker be “simple”? Davidson responds 
that the kind of theory he has in mind does not have to imply 
nomological T-sentences for every sentence of a language. But then 
he does not clarify which sentences of language have to possess 
their correspondent T-sentences being of nomological character and 
which, on the contrary, have to remain simple T-sentences. In this 
way, any mere accidental regularity and even any single instance 
could be a law! For example, we could build these two laws: 
 
1. “All the bars of gold are less than one km long” is true if and 
only if all the bars of gold are less than one kilometer long. 
2. “This bar of gold is less than a km long” is true if and only if 
this bar of gold is less than a kilometer long. 
 
As we can see, any instance of what Davidson considers a law 
will in turn be a law! And we could build a law for a real physical 
law in the same way: 
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3. “All the uranium bars are less than a km long” is true if and 
only if all the uranium bars are less than a kilometer long. 
 
As we know, a one-kilometer-long uranium bar cannot exist, 
because it would own a mass superior to the critical mass. According 
to physical laws, if uranium 235 overcomes its critical mass, a 
nuclear reaction follows. These three examples highlight different 
situations. Yet in Davidson’s opinion, all three biconditionals would 
be laws without distinctions. In this way, Davidson’s nomological 
solution places single instances and laws on equal level!  
 
 
3. Prior and Passing Theories 
 
Davidson, in the last part of Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (1984), Limits of the Literal, takes the limits of the 
application of his theory of meaning into consideration and 
recognises that “it is always an open question how well the theory 
an interpreter brings to a linguistic encounter will cope” (xix). 
According to Davidson, the field of application of his theory of 
meaning should be very wide to give a comprehensive explanation 
of how a language works. Yet at the same time it should be narrow 
enough to be rigorously formalised. However, missing in such a 
formalisation is exactly what helps us to apply the theory to a single 
case of interpretation, because it cannot be reduced to a clearly 
defined set of rules. In other words, an interpreter maintains the 
conversation by continually adjusting his theory of interpretation by 
means of his ability and intuition, but he is also aided by factors, 
such as luck, taste and sensitivity. But he cannot expect to succeed in 
formalising such considerations which lead to the adjustment of his 
theory in accordance with the latest incoming information.9 
                                                 
9 Cf. Davidson (1984: 279). 
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Interpretation is a gradual process led by the interpreter’s ability 
to adjust his own solutions to what the speaker seems to believe and 
mean. This is the main thesis claimed in Communication and 
Convention (1981) and in A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs (1986). 
Here Davidson attempts to explain “how people, who already have a 
language manage to apply their skill or knowledge to actual cases of 
interpretation” (1986: 441). The search for equivalence is described 
as an attempt to continually bring into action our expectations in the 
single communicative encounter in accordance with incoming 
information, to obtain an actual and concrete agreement with our 
interlocutor in translation. This interpretive process is possible 
because of a common background, a “basic agreement” or a “deeper 
equivalence” expressed by Davidson’s principle of translatability. 
According to this principle, translatability is guaranteed by a “basic 
cognitive apparatus” which is common to all human beings and 
enables the interpreter to detect the similarities in the speaker’s 
utterances which make it possible for them to understand each other.  
Interpretation is no longer a mechanical process governed by a 
clearly defined set of rules and conventions learned before their 
infinite cases of application. Davidson himself compares such 
theory to a “machine” that seems to make language a 
 
complex abstract object, defined by giving a finite list of 
expressions (words), rules for constructing meaningful 
concatenations of expressions (sentences), and a semantic 
interpretation of the meaningful expressions based on 
semantic features of individual words. We tend to forget 
that there are no such things in the world; there are only 
people and their various written and acoustical products 
(2001: 107-108). 
 
Now Davidson concedes that we never need this kind of 
language in our everyday communication with others, even though it 
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could still be interesting to philosophers, psychologists and linguists. 
We simply understand what other people tell us, and we manage to 
be understood without such an unobservable and unchangeable 
“object”. Davidson concludes “there is no such thing as what some 
philosophers (me included) have called a language” (1994a: 2). He 
questions the image of language he shared for a long time with most 
linguists and philosophers of language. Now he is more interested in 
phenomena such as lapsus linguae and malapropisms, which 
standard descriptions of linguistic competence do not take into 
consideration, because – according to Davidson – they are unable to 
explain how our communication succeeds, despite the presence of 
such phenomena.  
Davidson should have abandoned the concept of equivalence he 
borrowed from Tarski’s theory of formalised languages, because 
this concept, while suitable for a complex and abstract language 
built on the model of languages of deductive sciences, is not suitable 
for spoken languages in everyday life. Nevertheless, Davidson does 
not want to refute his former theoretical programme with this more 
recent paper and its theses.10 On the contrary, he intends to claim 
that a theory of meaning, such as the one he elaborated previously, 
can be used to describe the linguistic behaviour of speakers in a 
systematic and coherent way, rather than to explain the link between 
such a theoretical “machine” and our practical interest in 
understanding and being understood in every single case of 
interpretation, even where the phenomena stated by the theory are 
divergent. 
Davidson claims that the interpreter interprets a speaker with an 
interpretative theory (again based on Tarski’s model) called prior 
theory, which illustrates how the interpreter is already prepared to 
interpret the speaker (the first meaning). The prior theory always 
refers to a given speaker placed in a given situation, a speaker about 
                                                 
10 For criticism of Davidson, see Hacking (1986). 
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whom the interpreter knows little (for example, his dress, sex, etc.) – 
information acquired by an initial observation of his behaviour – or 
has deeper knowledge. Therefore there will be an infinite number of 
prior theories in accordance with the speakers, the interpreter's level 
of knowledge about the speaker’s customs, socio-cultural situation 
and background. During this interpretative process, the interpreter 
will modify his initial theory in accordance with the entry 
information, building one or more passing theories which express 
how the interpreter actually interprets the speaker. Davidson quotes 
as an example the case of Mrs. Malaprop, who, by saying “a nice 
derangement of epitaphs,” actually meant to say “a nice arrangement 
of epithets”: her interpreter has to use a new theory assigning a new 
meaning to “derangement” and “epitaph”.  
Yet simply because the interpreter applies a passing theory to 
understand the speaker, he cannot be certain that his accommodation 
of the prior theory will work for every other future utterance of that 
speaker, because, according to Davidson, a passing theory tells us 
only how we have to “interpret a particular utterance on a particular 
occasion” (1986: 443). So the prior theory will be continually 
modified with other passing theories, it will be improved through 
constant comparison with the speaker.11 Ultimately, the interpreter 
will understand the speaker through this constant, progressive 
adjustment of his own theories. In this way, Davidson underscores 
the interpreter’s creativity, which cannot be explained by a 
description of linguistic competence as a finite set of rules, 
conventions or uses determined by history, linguistic practices, etc., 
to apply to specific cases.12 Davidson intends to abandon such 
explanation of linguistic competence to stress instead the central 
role of creativity in language use. In fact, he maintains that constant 
accommodation of a prior theory and the use of passing theories to 
                                                 
11 Cf. Davidson (1986: 437). 
12 Cf. Davidson (1986: 443). 
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understand the speaker’s utterances characterise not only those 
situations where we have to understand lapsus linguae or 
malapropisms, but every interpretation, because he thinks phenomena 
such as lapsus linguae or malapropisms are “omnipresent and 
pervasive” (1986: 433). Therefore every communication needs an 
accommodation of the prior theory and a constant change of passing 
theories. Understanding can also take place without rules, uses or 
shared practices; maybe it is facilitated by these conventions, but 
what makes it possible is the creative dimension of our linguistic use.  
But linguistic phenomena such as lapsus linguae or 
malapropisms do not seem omnipresent; they are usually considered 
exceptional cases in our usual way of communicating. Speakers do 
not usually mistake their own words, they simply say what they 
mean. So we cannot totally abandon the descriptions of language 
that rely on rules and conventions, because these phenomena are not 
“rules” but “exceptions”. As Dummett claimed, conventions teach 
us: 
 
what constitutes a social practice; to repudiate the role of 
convention is to deny that a language is in this sense a 
practice. In the exceptional cases there are indeed no rules to 
follow: that is what makes such cases exceptional (1986: 474). 
 
On the contrary Davidson, emphasises the creative and 
productive power of language, giving as an example, in the paper 
James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty, Joyce’s use of language. Joyce 
abandons his nationality, religion and language, not to annihilate his 
language, but to recreate it, putting his reader “in the situation of the 
jungle linguist trying to get the hang of a new language and a novel 
culture” (1991: 11). Joyce’s “radical reader” somehow understands 
the meaning of what Joyce writes, even though he strays outside the 
rules and conventions of his own society and language. But we can 
also claim that Joyce’s way of writing could be considered an 
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“exceptional” case and not a typical case of communication. It is not 
so easy to understand how, without any rules, conventions, or social 
practices, the interpreter can understand the speaker in a real case of 
communication. 
However, Davidson does not believe that Joyce’s language is 
absolutely without ties, as it was created ex nihilo. Davidson 
disagrees with Humpty Dumpty: “When I use a word it means just 
what I choose it to mean” (1991: 1),  because he does not believe 
in the existence of a private language. As Wittgenstein claimed, 
without sharing one’s own language with anybody else, the speaker 
cannot possibly know what the correct language use is. Instead the 
language created by Joyce is intersubjective, and – however 
detached from rules and conventions it may be – it opens “a 
hermeneutic space between the reader and the text” (1991: 12),  
which is shared by both speakers.  
 
 
 
4. A “Deeper Equivalence” 
 
In 1986, Davidson proposed a theory of meaning based on the 
notion of linguistic use, to explain many translation cases (such as 
those of “functional equivalence”) which remain unexplained by the 
previous Davidsonian theory. In the words of Malmkjaer: “The 
theory Davidson advocates provides a method and a concept of what 
meaning is, which allows us to make sense of the linguistic and 
other behaviour of other persons, and to see how their use of certain 
sentences relates to their use of certain other sentences” (2005: 56).  
The past usage of sentences could surely help the interpreter/ 
translator, because they become a background against which 
linguistic items participate in semantic relationships formed by the 
momentary fusion of speaker, listener and contextual situation. 
Viewed from this perspective, we could describe translation as a 
process that occurs between the original text and a target text 
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through a series of convergences of passing theories. The bridge 
between the two sides of the process is the translator himself, who is 
the reader of the original text and the writer of the translation. In real 
cases of communication, functional equivalence becomes a 
momentary, always changing agreement between the interpreter or 
the translator and the speaker. In this sense, the translator’s role 
becomes that of “a mediator whose task it is to facilitate 
convergence on passing theories for people who do not share what 
we normally think of as ‘the same language’” (1993: 146). 
But Davidson’s attempt to describe functional equivalence seems 
to introduce a series of solutions ad hoc, rather than a real theory of 
meaning. Moreover, this solution does not avoid the problems of 
Davidson’s original theory, as examined above. As we have seen, 
Davidson did not abandon Tarski’s theory of truth at all, instead he 
tried to reconcile it with the new requirements for a theory of 
meaning. Moreover, the momentary convergence is only an 
equivalence of a long series of moments which constitutes the 
translation process, and it is made possible by a “deeper” agreement 
among speakers: the sharing of the same human mental dimension. 
It is this “more fundamental equivalence – Benjamin claims – which 
in turn engenders the possibility of the recognition of semantic 
equivalence” (1989: 64-65).   
Davidson refuses any form of conceptual relativism, rejecting the 
distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content. In the 
essay On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme (1974), Davidson 
tries to demonstrate that relativism and in particular the thesis of the 
radical difference between conceptual schemes, is bound to fail on 
its own. The thesis of the incomparability of radically different 
conceptual schemes is belied, in Davidson's opinion, by the 
metaphor used by the advocates of conceptual relativism. According 
to this metaphor, we can compare conceptual schemes to points of 
view that give us a radically different vision of reality: 
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The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of 
differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying 
paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if 
there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot 
them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim 
of dramatic incomparability (1984: 184). 
 
Davidson believes that it is possible to talk sensibly about the 
diversity of varying points of view (conceptual schemes) only if the 
latter can be placed into a “system of common coordinates” in 
which it is possible to compare them. Davidson concludes that, if 
these points of view have something in common, they cannot be so 
radically different! This means that the same recognition of 
similarity and difference which occurs in translation is made 
possible because of a fundamental cognitive identity among human 
beings. Therefore, translatability is guaranteed by the fact that there 
is human communication.  
However, this solution seems to simply move the problem of 
explaining functional equivalence to another level of explanation. If 
this fundamental identity can explain the “deeper” equivalence by 
means of which translation is always possible, it is not sufficient to 
explain the evident differences in translation quality. In order to 
explain why some translations seem to be more adequate than others 
in a contextual situation, it is necessary to refer also to the 
fundamental difference and individuality of the subjects who 
translate, to the translator’s creativity underscored by the “last” 
Davidson. In this way, however, what remains to be explained is 
exactly how the translator can create something new by grasping the 
functional equivalence of sentences of the source text and sentences 
of the target text. Although Davidson recognises the importance of 
the translator’s creativity, he remains anchored to the relation of 
equivalence proposed in his theory of radical interpretation and is 
unable to fully explain the creativity of the relation between the 
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interpreter and the speaker. The fact of sharing a “basic cognitive 
apparatus” can certainly explain the fundamental reason why 
translation is always possible; however, it does not explain why 
translations differ one from the other, and why we consider some 
translations better and more creative than others. 
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